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ABSTRACT
Upon gaining independence, most Spanish American countries had ac-
cumulated a substantial external debt, and by 1829 each defaulted. It took de-
cades for these countries to settle their debts and even longer for them to ac-
cess new loans. We argue that a major factor influencing the pattern of debt
service was the incidence of war. War created incentives for governments to
channel scarce resources to «emergency» spending and domestic debt ser-
vice, rather than to the repayment of the foreign debt. Interestingly, we de-
tect an asymmetry between countries long in good standing with creditors
and those that had only recently settled. Countries that had established a lon-
ger record of continuous debt service were far less likely to default in times
of war. We also find that international wars were responsible for the largest
effects.
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1 See Safford (1992).
RESUMEN
En este artículo sugerimos que un factor que determinó en buena medida
la trayectoria del pago de la deuda externa de los países hispanoamericanos
en las primeras décadas de su vida independiente, fue la enorme incidencia
de conflictos armados en la región. Las frecuentes guerras crearon incenti-
vos para que éstos dirigieran sus escasos recursos a gastos militares y al ser-
vicio de la deuda interna en vez de a la deuda exterior. Un resultado intere-
sante es la asimetría que se registra entre los países que llegaron a renegociar
su deuda exitosamente y mantuvieron su servicio por largos períodos de
tiempo, y la de aquellos que no tuvieron mayor éxito en sus renegociacio-
nes. En el caso de estos últimos, las guerras registraron efectos negativos
mayores. También demostramos que las guerras internacionales tuvieron los
efectos más dramáticos.
Palabras clave: hispanoamérica, deuda externa, deuda impagada,
guerra
1. INTRODUCTION
Upon gaining independence, most Spanish American countries had ac-
cumulated a large external debt in the form of sovereign bonds floated in
London. By 1829, each had defaulted. It took years, even decades, for these
countries to re-schedule these debts and even longer for them to access new
loans. Carlos Marichal (1989), in his masterful study of Latin America’s debt
crises, argues that the region passed through several «loan cycles» between
1820 and 1930, each of which witnessed a period of massive capital inflows
followed by a string of defaults connected to the upswings and downswings
of business cycles in creditor nations.
This paper complements Marichal’s important contribution with an ex-
ploration of the role that political upheavals and wars might have played in
molding the observed patterns of settlement and default. Political historians,
in considering the early independence period, unfailingly note the preva-
lence of uprisings and civil wars 1. More recently, economic historians such
as North, Summerhill and Weingast (2000), Bates, Coatsworth and
Williamson (2007), and Coatsworth (2008), have argued that the extreme
violence and instability had institutional roots, and that the wars themselves
were destructive economically and were a proximate cause of rates of eco-
nomic growth that were much slower than in the United States and several
Western European countries. The parallels between the «lost decades» of
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2 There is an extensive literature on the economics of sovereign debt which has been success-
ful in identifying a number of potential rationales for servicing foreign debt obligations. These in-
clude reputation so as to ensure access to future credit (see for example Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981,
and Tomz, 2007) and fear of military and or economic sanctions (see Bulow and Rogoff, 1989 and
Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2005).
political disorder and economic decline and the lengthy period of default
are tantalizing.
This paper offers a comparative study of the relationship between war
and external debt in Spanish America in the fifty years after independence.
The key questions are whether war contributed to default, and as a corollary,
whether war impeded the successful settlement of external debts that were
in default. To some it may seem obvious that the financial stresses of war
might increase the probability of default on the external debt. However, the
relationship between war and debt is more complex than it appears at first
sight. Governments may find it extremely important to maintain (or esta-
blish) external debt service, even in times of war, for two reasons. First, fo-
reign capital has the potential to provide enormous resources to the state,
thus facilitating its ability to successfully carry out military operations.
Second, some of the wars fought by Spanish American countries —most
poignantly in the case of Mexico— were fought with European countries that
justified their initiation of the conflict precisely because of the lack of pay-
ment of foreign creditors. Thus, in some cases war might provide incentives
for debt settlement, rather than impair it.
The literature on sovereign debt demonstrates that the motivations for
debt service are complex enough even in the absence of war 2. The decision
to default (or to settle) is a political one that depends upon the incentive
structure and beliefs of the relevant political actors. Further, these incenti-
ves and beliefs, as well as the macroeconomic fluctuations that affect the
ability of a government to service its debt, may or may not be correlated
with the incidence of conflict. We would have liked to present a formal di-
rect statistical test of the relative importance of war on default, but the pau-
city of basic economic data on these countries during this time period pre-
cludes the construction of an econometric model that is both properly
specified and has sufficient degrees of freedom. Alternatively, our approach
is three-pronged: First, we examine the descriptive statistics and correla-
tions between wars, defaults and settlements. To accomplish this, we cons-
truct a new and improved database on the external debt service histories of
Spanish American countries from 1830 to 1870. We compare these series
with our own database of wars, which augments the Gleditsch (2004) revi-
sion of the Correlates of War project (Singer and Small, 1994). The data
show that wars are associated with most of the defaults during the period of
our study. We also find that debt settlements occurred mostly during peace-
ful interludes. In addition, we detect an asymmetry between countries long
in good standing with creditors and those that had only recently settled.
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3 The debt of the Central American Federation is omitted from this study, because the data are
much more sparse. In the 1830s the responsibility for the Central American loan was split among
the former members of the federation. Brazil and Haiti are omitted from our study as they differ
from Spanish American countries in many critical ways, particularly insofar as their political his-
tory and institutions.
4 An analysis of the degree to which the new countries were «fleeced» by savvy London bankers
is beyond the scope of this paper. See Marichal (1989) Dawson (1990) and Flandreau and Flores
(2007) for a discussion. For our purpose it is sufficient to note that the countries began nationhood
encumbered with foreign debt.
Countries that had established a longer record of continuous debt service
were far less likely to default in times of war than those that had only re-
cently settled their debt. Furthermore, many of the former countries did in-
deed access international capital markets to finance wars —namely,
Argentina, Chile and Peru. Only Venezuela was able to float a new loan du-
ring civil war despite having a checkered credit history.
In order to obtain direct evidence on how wars affected government fi-
nances and budgetary choices we examine detailed data from the countries’
respective Ministerios de Hacienda (Treasuries). The dramatic fiscal impacts
of certain wars are clearly observable in the data, and we document how
some of these wars affected default and re-scheduling decisions. We also
conduct econometric tests for structural breaks in the time series of sove-
reign debt yield spreads versus the British consol. The bond price data from
which the spreads are calculated are monthly series over the years 1830 to
1869 on the London Stock Exchange. We find that the breaks causing sig-
nificant deterioration in the yield spread (indicating a reduced probability
of settlement or an increased probability of default) are frequently asso-
ciated with wars, and often the same wars whose importance was sugges-
ted by the Treasury data. Moreover, the data suggests that international
wars —not civil wars— had the most significant effects. At least for some
countries, a greater threat to fiscal solvency seems to have been posed by fo-
reign intervention.
2. LOANS, DEFAULTS AND SETTLEMENTS
Beginning in 1822, the new countries of Spanish America contracted
loans with major financial firms in London to achieve and consolidate their
independence and to finance the new states and militaries 3. Table 1 gives the
basic details of these loans. The amounts varied from one million pounds
each to Buenos Aires and Chile, to 6.4 million and 6.75 million pounds to
Mexico and Gran Colombia, respectively 4.
Default came quickly, with Peru the first to miss payment in April 1826
and Buenos Aires the last to join the ranks in January 1828. The literature at-
tributes the defaults to several factors, including continuing war, and a severe
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5 Dawson (1990) refers to an offer in Paris to loan to Peru at a 40 per cent discount.
commercial crisis with intercontinental dimensions (Marichal, 1989;
Dawson, 1990; Neal, 1998). In many cases, default was averted temporarily
because a portion of the loan proceeds had been held back in London to
cover the first few dividend payments. Just prior to, and in the period im-
mediately following the initial default, several of the countries directed their
diplomats in London and Paris to try to contract new foreign loans to cover
dividend payments on the original loans. In at least one case, potential cre-
ditors offered terms that were refused 5.
The re-scheduling history of these countries is assembled in Table 2. The
table shows the defaulted principal and interest at the time of re-scheduling.
A major problem resulting from default was the accumulation of interest
arrears. This became a major issue for the Spanish American countries be-
TABLE 1
SPANISH-AMERICAN SOVEREIGN LOANS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Date Amount Interest Issue Date Dates of DebtCountry * of (pounds of Re-scheduling
Loan sterling) Rate Price Default Agreements Service **
Buenos
Aires 1824 1,000,000 6 85 1828 1857 60,000
Chile 1822 1,000,000 6 70 1826 1842 60,000
Gran 1822 2,000,000 6 84 1826 — 405,000
Colombia *** 1824 4,750,000 6 88 1826
Ecuador 1855
New Granada 1845, 1861
Venezuela 1840,1859
Mexico 1824 3,200,000 5 58 1827 1831, 1837, 1846 352,000
1825 3,200,000 6 89 1827 1851
Peru 1822 450,000 6 88 1826 1849 108,960
1824 750,000 6 82 1826
1825 616,000 6 78 1826
Sources: Columns 1-4: Marichal (1989), p. 28. Column 5: Dawson, chapters 6-8. Column 6: Fenn’s
Compendium, various years, Costeloe, Times of London. Column 7: Authors’ calculations based on Amaral (1995),
Resumen de la Hacienda de Chile, Memoria de Hacienda de Colombia (1826), Rodríguez (1985), Memoria de
Hacienda de Nueva Granada, Memoria de Hacienda de Venezuela, Tantalean Arbulú (1983), Tenenbaum (1986).
Notes:
* The Central American Confederation, which contracted a loan for 163,300 pounds, is not included.
** Debt service is approximated by taking the annual interest charges on the full principal. The amortization
charges are only known for some of the cases, and were typically 1/2 per cent or 1 per cent per year. Thus, the debt
service estimates here underestimate total debt service by a small amount.
*** Gran Colombia split into Ecuador, New Granada and Venezuela subsequent to contracting the loan.
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6 See Liehr (1989) for a study of the Gran Colombian debt, with an emphasis on the 1820s. See
also Memoria de la Hacienda de Venezuela (1838-1840), Memoria de la Hacienda de Nueva Granada
(1838-1840), and Terán (1896).
cause of the length of time that they were in default. Re-scheduling packages
often included retiring old bonds, and issuing two classes of new bonds —one
for the defaulted principal and one for the interest arrears—. Often there was
a (sometimes temporary) reduction in the interest rate on the original prin-
cipal, and deferred scheduling of payment on the interest arrears (e.g.,
Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, New Granada). Generally, interest rates were in-
creased incrementally, presumably reflecting a belief in a gradual improve-
ment in government finances over time. When old bonds were not retired, as
in Buenos Aires and Chile, new bonds were also issued for the interest arre-
ars. By the time of re-scheduling, it was not uncommon for the foreign debt
to have increased dramatically in size because of the capitalization of inte-
rest arrears. The agreements typically stipulated that a portion of customs re-
venues was earmarked for debt service.
Special mention must be made of the case of Gran Colombia. The country
ceased to exist around 1830, and its debt was partitioned between Ecuador,
New Granada and Venezuela after these countries were created. However, it
was only in 1834 that the formula for the partition of the debt was negotia-
ted by New Granada and Venezuela, representatives of Ecuador not being in
attendance. In 1838 the governments of all three countries formally recog-
nized the debt according to this agreement. New Granada, present-day
Colombia, assumed 50 per cent of the debt and arrears, Venezuela 28.5 per
cent, and Ecuador 21.5 per cent. Venezuela was the first of the three to re-
schedule its debt in 1840, New Granada followed in 1845 and Ecuador in
1855. None kept their original re-scheduling arrangement all the way to
1870 6. Clearly, one of the reasons for the delay in re-scheduling was the dis-
solution of Gran Colombia and the necessity of negotiating an agreement for
dividing its debts among successor states.
The default dates listed on Table 2 are based on a strict definition —the
first missed coupon payment—. Sometimes, however, countries were late
and continued to make payments, although in arrears. Ecuador missed cou-
pon payments in 1859 and 1860, but it resumed service on its debt until 1869.
During the period 1860-1869 it was always two or more coupon payments be-
hind. Other countries that missed payments paid bondholders in kind
through the issue of customs certificates or additional bonds capitalizing the
interest arrears. For this reason, in some cases we include a second date in
italics that represents the definitive date at which such payments stopped.
Several countries had multiple re-schedulings and defaults (Mexico, New
Granada and Venezuela). Mexico stands out with four re-scheduling attempts
in the period (all which were very short-lived). In contrast, Argentina, Chile
and Peru had durable settlements. Chile settled in 1842 and maintained an
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7 For a discussion of the Peruvian case see Vizcarra (2009).
excellent reputation as a good debtor for most of the rest of the century. Peru
followed in 1849 and serviced its foreign debt faithfully until 1876 7. Buenos
Aires settled its debt in 1857 and became part of Argentina, one of the big-
gest borrowers of the late 19th century until the Baring Crisis.
Table 3 lists the new loans by Spanish American countries up to 1870.
The table shows that Argentina, Chile and Peru accounted for the vast ma-
jority of the new debt, most of which was earmarked for war expenses, in-
frastructure investment, and debt conversion. The only country that issued
new debt while simultaneously in default on an old debt was Venezuela.
However, this loan was floated with the express purpose of trying to regain
TABLE 3
NEW LENDING TO 1870
(1) (2) Amount (3) (4) (5)
Country Date (pounds Interest Issue Reason for Loanof Loan sterling) Rate Price
Argentina 1866 500,000 6 War expenses
Argentina 1868 1,950,000 6 72,5 War expenses
Buenos Aires 1870 1,034,700 6 88 Railroads, port
Chile 1858 1,554,800 4.5 92 Railroads, general
expenses
1866 450,000 6 92.5 War
1867 2,000,000 6 84 Conversion, war
1867 626,700 7 92 War
1870 1,012,700 5 83
Colombia 1863 200,000 6 Railroad
Peru 1853 2,600,000 4.5 Renegotiation of external debt
1853 1,800,000 4.5 Conversion of domestic debt
1853 800,000 Conversion of domestic debt
1853 400,000 4.5 Railroad
1862 5,500,000 4.5 93 Conversion
1865 10,000,000 5 83,5 Conversion, war expenses
1869 290,000 5 70 Railroad
1870 11,920,000 6 82,5 Railroads
Venezuela 1862 1,000,000 6 63 War expenses, old claims,
interest in arrears on old
debt, creation of Bank of
Venezuela
1864 1,500,000 6 60 Old claims, back pay to
army, roads
Sources: Fenn’s. Compendia, Marichal (1989), Platt (1968), Rippy (1959).
Note: Venezuela issued an additional 210,000 pounds of 6 per cent bonds in 1862 capitalizing the
arrears on the interest accumulated to that date from the unsuccessful re-scheduling agreement of 1859.
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8 The Venezuelan loan was roundly ridiculed in the financial press. See Eastwick (1868), and
Committee of Spanish American Bondholders (1866).
9 See Gleditsch (2004, p. 234), for a description of the nuances of the criterion when applied to
different types of conflicts.
10 The underlying list of wars is presented in the Appendix.
solvency, the discount was enormous and most of the proceeds simply went
to pay off old war debt 8.
3. WARS, SETTLEMENTS AND DEFAULTS
After gaining independence through successful revolutions, most of
Spain’s former colonies suffered decades of frequent warfare. In some cases,
the record of conflict is almost incessant. We discuss two alternative defini-
tions to evaluate the incidence of war in the region. The first is the Gleditsch
(2004) revision of Singer and Small’s Correlates of War (1992) database. This
database is commonly employed in the political science literature. It employs
the criterion that counts wars only if more than 1,000 people died per year 9.
A problem with the casualty threshold is that it introduces a bias against re-
cording wars in small countries. For example, Ecuador, a small country,
fought a war known as the Guerra de los Chihuahuas in 1833-34 that does
not appear in the popular political science database, but was by all accounts
a major event in 19th century Ecuadorian history. So we construct a second
list by combining those wars examined in Scheina (2002) and Bethell (1987).
This list takes a broader definition of wars, so as to include even some short-
lived rebellions. In both cases wars are coded as indicator variables: «1» for
war; «0» for peace. Clearly, this is an extremely coarse way to measure con-
flict. The wars themselves were quite heterogeneous in intensity, breadth and
origins. However, we are utilizing these data to make a preliminary assess-
ment of the coincidence of debt settlement and repayment with conflict of
any sort. We include international wars in our database, because it will be
instructive to see the relative importance of international and internal con-
flict financially and for debt service. Figures 1 and 2 display the patterns that
emerge 10.
In both databases, Buenos Aires and Mexico lead in conflict, with con-
flict being almost unceasing in Mexico. There are significant differences bet-
ween the two databases for some countries. Ecuador is particularly under-re-
presented by the Gleditsch measure because of the death threshold, but other
countries are also greatly affected. Much early conflict in the 1820s is not
detected, and a number of rebellions in the 1830s and 1840s (Ecuador,
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) do not register in the Gleditsch case. Still, even
using our alternative criteria, certain interludes of relative peace appear for
some countries: Buenos Aires from 1853 to 1858, Chile in the 1840s, New
Granada for 1843-1850, Ecuador from 1835-1845, Peru in the late 1840s and
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Venezuela from 1838 until 1845. Mexico is the only country that did not have
more than a three-year period of relative calm.
In a pooled dataset of indebted Spanish American countries between
1825 and 1870, the correlation coefficient between debt service and war is
–0.02 when the Gleditsch definition of war is used, and –0.13 when our al-
ternative is used. Neither correlation is large, suggesting a weak negative re-
lationship between war and debt service (we also calculated these correlation
FIGURE 1
WAR IN SPANISH AMERICA, 1825-1870
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FIGURE 2
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11 The correlations between service and the lagged war are –0.01 (Gleditsch definition) and
–0.18 (alternative definition).
12 The proportions are 7/14 and 12/14 when lagged war, rather than coincident war, is emplo-
yed. The relationships are also strong when serial defaults are isolated (6/9 and 8/9 for the different
definitions of war).
coefficients for debt service and lagged war with similar results) 11.
Notwithstanding, simple correlations between war and debt service over the
entire period are too broad a measure to provide insightful evidence about
the relationship between war and debt service.
As an alternative, in Table 4 we discuss the timing of settlements and de-
fault and whether they coincided with military conflict. The table shows that
of the twelve debt settlements that were reached during this period, four or
five of them occurred during a war (the exact number depending upon whe-
ther the Gleditsch or alternative measure of war is used). However, in two of
the cases (Mexico 1846 and Venezuela 1859), the settlements came in the
months before hostilities had broken out and were followed by an imme-
diate default. Thus, few re-schedulings occurred during military conflict. In
contrast, eleven of the fourteen defaults occurred during a time of war, when
the broader definition of war is used; five when the Gleditsch criterion is
used 12. Overall, the data on the timing of war, settlement and default is con-
sistent with the view that war may be a cause of default and inhibit success-
ful debt settlement. In the next section we develop an analytical framework
that discusses the mechanisms through which war might have affected fo-
reign debt settlement in the region.
TABLE 4
WAR, SETTLEMENTS AND DEFAULTS
Re-schedulings Defaults (all) Defaults (serial)
War (Gleditsch) 4/12 5/14 4/9
War (Alternative) 5/12 11/14 6/9
War Lagged (Gleditsch) 7/14 6/9
War Lagged (Alternative) 12/14 8/9
4. WAR AND GOVERNMENT CHOICES
As discussed above, sovereigns determine whether or not to honor their
foreign debt obligations based on cost-benefit calculations that are political
in nature. In what follows, we argue that for Spanish American countries in
default (all of the region after the revolutionary wars) chronic warfare built
in an incentive structure that militated against external debt settlement and
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13 On financial markets restrictions to float debt see Borchard (1951, p. xxix). Governments
could also print money. The one country in our study that made extensive use of this option was
Buenos Aires, see Irigoin (2000).
14 This is a simplifying assumption. A government may gain some utility from partial debt ser-
vice, and may also gain utility from service over and above the contracted requirement.
service. In particular, warfare increases the opportunity cost of the funds
committed to honor external obligations as the return from military and
other emergency domestic spending rise. Countries in default could not float
government bonds in foreign financial markets, so they were severely cons-
trained by domestic revenues (ordinary revenues plus domestic credit) 13.
Thus, the new republics had to choose whether to spend scarce funds on ex-
ternal debt service or other items, such as military spending, domestic debt
service, and patronage. Each had a different political payoff, which contri-
buted to what one might call the government’s utility.
We illustrate the government’s decision-making process in an indifference
curve-budget line diagram (Figure 3). The vertical axis measures the spen-
ding on external debt service, and the horizontal axis measures spending on
all other items. In this case the budget line reflects the government’s total re-
venue, and has a slope of –1 because one peso spent on external debt signi-
fies one peso less spent elsewhere. The indifference curves have a peculiar
shape, each consisting of two vertical segments. The reason for this is that the
marginal utility of external debt service is zero up to the amount required to
fully service the debt, and it is also zero beyond that amount 14. The hori-
zontal distance between the two segments of each indifference curve has im-
portant political-economic significance. It indicates the amount of additio-
nal government spending on other goods and services that would bring the
same additional political utility as fully servicing the external debt. The gap
will be larger between the two segments as the marginal utility of external
FIGURE 3
Budget Line
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Debt
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debt service rises relative to the marginal utility of government spending on
other goods and services. Because of diminishing returns to domestic spen-
ding, the «higher» the indifference curve, the larger the gap between its seg-
ments. The equilibrium shown in Figure 3 depicts a government choosing to
service its external debt.
We argue that war affected the government choices in two fundamental
ways. First, as mentioned above, war is associated with greater returns on
military spending and other domestic «emergency» spending relative to fo-
reign debt service. We show below that for most of these countries, domes-
tic borrowing was a vital source of emergency revenue during war, and that
governments put great emphasis on maintaining this lifeline of credit.
Political instability led to a persistently high utility return to both domestic
debt service and military expenditures. In the context of our model, this im-
plies that the indifference curves in a state of war have smaller gaps bet-
ween the two segments than indifference curves in times of peace, which
will increase the likelihood of a default equilibrium. Such a default equili-
brium is illustrated by the corner solution in Figure 4. Second, war may re-
duce the amount of revenue available to the state. This can happen if, for
example, a blockade interrupts trade and therefore customs revenue. A re-
duction of revenue would shift the budget constraint to the left. This effect
would further increase the likelihood of an equilibrium in which the state
defaults on its foreign debt. This is because the closer one is to the origin,
the smaller are the gaps between the two segments of the indifference cur-
ves. Thus, through a relatively higher return to military —or other domes-
tic— spending as a result of the direct demands of war, and/or their related
reduction in revenues, war will often be associated with an increased like-
lihood of government default.
FIGURE 4
Budget Line
(slope is –1)External
Debt
Service
(pesos)
Other Govt
Spending
(pesos)
U0
U1
03_SICOTTE  19/6/09  12:04  Página 261
RICHARD SICOTTE/CATALINA VIZCARRA
262
15 Platt (1968) and Tomz (2007).
16 An in depth discussion of this result is beyond the scope of this paper. Obviously there are a
number of potential explanations. Wars might not have affected as significantly their yield spreads
because of their economic and/or political fundamentals, because of the specific characteristics of
their commitment to repay, or simply because of the specifics of the conflicts themselves. We leave
this discussion for further research.
Notwithstanding, there are two countervailing cases in which war could
potentially increase the likelihood of debt service. First, as the «sanctions» li-
terature emphasizes, a war that is precipitated by creditor country retaliation
for a default obviously raises the utility of external debt service relative to
the utility gained from domestic spending. Scholars have overwhelmingly
shown, however, that British government intervention on behalf of the bond-
holders was minimal in our period of study (Mexico is the exception that
confirms the rule) 15. Therefore, we do not anticipate this effect to have pla-
yed a major role. Second, countries that are in good standing with foreign
creditors (the case of Chile since 1842, Peru since 1849 and Argentina since
1857) might prioritize debt service relative to domestic spending if they have
access to foreign loans to finance war expenditure. Indeed, we show below
that for these countries the negative impact of wars on their respective cre-
dit risks dwindles after successful settlement 16.
5. STATE FINANCES AND WAR
In what follows we provide evidence consistent with these insights.
However, first it is important to provide some indication of the overall fi-
nancial burden that external debt service constituted for these countries.
Examining the ratio (hypothetical or actual) of external debt service to go-
vernment revenues gives us a first glance into the likelihood of debt service
compliance. From the treasury accounts we were able to construct the ratio
of external debt service to government revenue for these countries for some
years. These data are presented in Table 5. The debt service ratios for Gran
Colombia successor states (New Granada, Venezuela and Ecuador) were the
highest, until each of them re-scheduled their debts in the 1840s and 1850s,
thereby greatly reducing debt service. Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru initially
had debt service burdens in the twenty per cent range, but these declined
due to increased revenues even before those countries resumed payment on
their debt. Note that each of these countries resumed payment on the origi-
nal debt plus capitalized interest arrears, which entailed a greater debt ser-
vice than originally. Finally, Mexico began the period with the lowest debt
service burden, which remained more stable than the others through the pe-
riod —at roughly ten per cent of government revenues.
There is no clear pattern between debt service ratios and default. Some
countries defaulted on their debt in spite of facing relatively low debt service
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17 They compare relatively well with Brazilian ratios, which fluctuated between 15 to 45 per
cent. The ratios of debt service to total taxes in eighteenth century France and Great Britain were
around 40 to 50 per cent. See Summerhill (2008, p. 10).
ratios. In the case of Ecuador’s default in 1869, for example, the debt service
burden was about five per cent of government revenues, a similar ratio to
Venezuela’s when it defaulted in 1847. Compared to the debt service ratios of
other debtor countries, the Spanish American ratios are relatively low (with
the exception of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela before their first episo-
des of debt renegotiation) 17. Contrary to the widely held view that Latin
America’s debt burden was unmanageable from the start, the data suggest
that none of these countries were condemned to remain in default due to an
intractable foreign debt burden. We now turn to examine the Treasury re-
cords in order to provide some insight on the effects of warfare on the fiscal
finances of these countries.
TABLE 5
RATIO OF EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE TO GOVERNMENT REVENUE
Country
1825- 1831- 1836- 1841- 1846- 1851- 1856- 1861- 1866-
1830 1835 1840 1845 1850 1855 1860 1865 1870
Buenos Aires 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05
Chile N.A. 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.09
Ecuador N.A. 0.64 0.53 N.A. 0.44 0.44 0.05 0.05 0.05
Gran Colombia 0.29 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Mexico 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.15 N.A. N.A.
New Granada N.A. 0.44 0.44 0.34 0.06 0.15 0.24
Peru 0.23 N.A. N.A. 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.07
Venezuela N.A. 0.44 0.36 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.10 N.A. N.A.
Sources: Amaral (1995), Burgin (1946), Irigoin (2000), Cortés-Conde (1989), Resumen de la Hacienda
Pública de Chile, Rodríguez (1985), Memoria de la Hacienda de Colombia, Tenenbaum (1995), Memoria de
la Hacienda de Nueva Granada, Tantalean Arbulú (1983), Berglund (1995), Memoria de la Hacienda de
Venezuela, Fenn’s Compendia.
Notes:
* These are not five-year averages, but selected years in each five-year range. Five-year averages were
not possible to calculate because of the lack of data. The dates used for each country are as follows:
Buenos Aires: 1828, 1834, 1837, 1844, 1849, 1851, 1858, 1864. Chile: 1833, 1839, 1843, 1849, 1853,
1857. Ecuador: 1834, 1839, 1847, 1854, 1857, 1863. Gran Colombia: 1825. Mexico: 1827, 1834, 1839, 1842,
1850, 1853, 1860. New Granada: 1832, 1838, 1844, 1847, 1853, 1857. Peru: 1830, 1846, 1850. Venezuela:
1832, 1839, 1844, 1849, 1854, 1859.
** Figures in italics denote hypothetical debt service, as the country was in default.
*** Figures reflect the debt service on new foreign borrowing that occurred after settlement. See
table 3 in the appendix.
**** The figures for Ecuador, New Granada and Venezuela prior to their re-scheduling agreements
are based upon the partition of Gran Colombia’s debt agreed to between 1834 and 1838.
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5.1. Military expenditures during war
The military costs of wars could wreak havoc on any plans to service the
foreign debt. One can compare the trend of military expenditures and total
expenditures for the various countries in the panels of Figure 5. Examination
of the records of the Treasury ministries indicates that the military expendi-
tures averaged about 1/3 of total government expenditures over the period.
Military expenditures tend to rise substantially during wartime, reaching ma-
xima of nearly 3/4 of expenditures during major wars. These are likely un-
derestimates, because data are often missing during the years with the most
serious conflicts. For example, data from the Treasury are missing during
Ecuador’s wars in 1833, 1845, 1852, and 1859-1860. Venezuelan and New
Granadan data during the height of their civil wars are either missing or in-
complete. Peru’s Treasury did not publish an annual report between 1832
and 1845. The Mexican case is particularly instructive. There are several spi-
kes in the military expenditures series: corresponding with the Federalist
Revolt of 1832, the Texas War of 1835-1836, again in 1838-1841, and just
FIGURE 5
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18 Stevens (1991, p. 11).
prior to the U.S. invasion. Total expenditures peak in 1852, but this is due to
the disbursement of proceeds from the U.S. war indemnity. Military expen-
ditures rise again during the Ayutla Revolt of 1854-55. But just as significant
is the complete absence of expenditures data for the height of the U.S.-
Mexican War, and for the internal War of the Reforma. These wars were im-
mensely costly and disruptive of the Treasury. One indicator of the disruption
is that there were twenty-nine changes at the head of the Treasury Ministry
in the thirty-six months from January 1846 to December 1848 18. Aside from
missing data, in some cases like that of Venezuela, there is every reason to be-
lieve that the Treasury accounts for military expenditures are dramatically
understated (see Berglund, 1995).
Sources: The Course of Exchange and the Economist.
Note: We used the Gleditsch-Correlates of War criteria for Buenos Aires/Argentina and Mexico, and
we used the alternative criteria for the other countries.
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19 See Centeno (2002), Deas (1982), Gootenberg (1996), Jaramillo, Maisel, and Urrutia (2001),
Marichal and Carmagnani (2001), Rodríguez (1985) and Tenenbaum (1995).
20 Throughout the paper, when possible, we present all figures converted to British pounds ster-
ling. The figures are not deflated, as reliable price indices do not exist in every case.
21 Fenn (1867, p. 289). See also Terán (1896).
5.2. Revenue during war
The ability to raise revenue through taxation was notoriously weak in
early republican Spanish America. Scholars have emphasized weak admi-
nistrative structure, lack of political will to tax the property of the landed eli-
tes, and general poverty as reasons for the inability of the central govern-
ments to collect significant revenues in the form of taxes 19.
Figure 5 shows that some countries were able to increase ordinary reve-
nues during war, a notable example is Chile, but revenues usually fell during
conflict. The figure also shows the predominance of customs revenues, usually
accounting for over half of total ordinary revenues. Customs was the easiest
tax to collect because the revenue was collected at geographic bottlenecks for
the transit of commerce. This factor made customs also easy to attack. Naval
blockades stand out as a key factor in the explanation of some of the most
drastic reductions in revenues during wars. Most of the countries in our study
had one or two major ports that accounted for an overwhelming portion of the
traffic. In Mexico, it was Veracruz and Tampico; in Ecuador, Guayaquil; in
Peru, Callao. But perhaps none of the debtors was more reliant on customs
than Buenos Aires. Panel A of Figure 5 shows the trend of customs revenues,
total revenues, military expenditures and total expenditures in Buenos Aires
for the years 1830-1861 20. Years in which there was a naval blockade are high-
lighted. The dominance of customs for revenue, and military for expenses is
clear. What is most striking, however, is the degree to which the blockades of
the late 1830s and the mid 1840s affected revenues and the budget deficit.
The government financed the deficit by issuing currency, causing the value
of the paper peso to plummet (Burgin, 1946; Irigoin, 2000).
There are other illustrative examples of the importance of blockades.
When Peru blockaded Guayaquil for ten months beginning in 1858, it com-
pletely cut off trade and led directly to Ecuador’s default 21. Although trade re-
bounded, and with it customs revenues, Ecuador remained in arrears until
it repudiated the 1855 settlement in 1869. In short, the naval blockade was
a potentially potent and debilitating tool of war at the time, which dramati-
cally affected governments’ debt service decisions.
5.3. Emergency debt accumulation during war
Figure 5 clearly shows that wars coincided with burgeoning budget de-
ficits, spurred on by increased military expenditures and, often, decreased
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22 Memoria de la Hacienda de Venezuela, 1857.
revenues. With the exception of Chile, Peru and Argentina when those coun-
tries borrowed abroad, the main means for covering the deficit was do-
mestic borrowing. Domestic emergency credit took many forms.
Governments often fell behind in paying civil servants, and even in some
cases the military. There were also forced and unforced loans from mer-
chants, mortgages of different «ramos» of the treasury, and government
bond issues. These debts, which ballooned during wartime, were serviced
piecemeal for years thereafter. For example, Venezuela was plagued by fre-
quent rebellions beginning in the late 1840s. By 1856, it had so institutio-
nalized domestic debt rollover that the treasury’s division in charge of it,
known as the «Ramo de Liquidación» (or Solvency Branch), accounted for
75 per cent of total (ordinary plus extraordinary) government revenues. The
largest claimants, together making up 63 per cent, were the «acreedores co-
rrientes» (principally unpaid salaries), and the «acreedores por contrato»
(merchant loans) 22. The accounts detail a bewildering array of short-term
emergency credit operations.
The case studies by Berglund (1995), Deas (1982), Gootenberg (1996),
Halperin Donghi (1982), and Tenenbaum (1986) show that although foreign
resident merchants provided the funds for some of the revolving debt, most
was domestically financed. For most countries, reliable data series on the
size of the domestic debt and domestic debt service do not exist. There are
some series, however, that provide indications of the dimensions of do-
mestic debt accumulation. According to Quiroz (1995), Peru’s domestic debt
more than quintupled between 1830 and 1845, exceeding one million
pounds sterling. Peru was at war during ten of those years. Tenenbaum’s
(1995) series of domestic loans in Mexico show enormous increases during
the war of Texas’ secession, and during the French blockade in 1839. In
both instances domestic loans accounted for over thirty per cent of total
government revenues. The most significant increase in Chilean internal debt
from independence to 1870 occurred precisely during wars, on the one hand
with Peru and Bolivia in the 1830s, and against Spain in the 1860s
(Mamalakis, 1978).
The chaos that often accompanied the severe conflicts meant that it could
take several years for the Treasury to even become aware of the full scale of
the new debts, and regain financial footing. A good illustrative example is
that of New Granada. In 1845 the Treasury of New Granada was just starting
to get a handle on the financial effects of the War of the Supremes, which
ended in 1842. In its 1845 Treasury Report the accounting for the war starts
to emerge. The minister explains that in 1840 and 1841 there were decreed
forced loans, voluntary loans, and fines on the rebels, and that in 1843 much
of those funds finally made it to Bogota. He also suggests that they paid in-
terest on the domestic debt in 1844. He then enumerates the types and rough
03_SICOTTE  19/6/09  12:04  Página 270
WAR AND FOREIGN DEBT SETTLEMENT IN EARLY REPUBLICAN SPANISH AMERICA
271
estimates of the debt accrued during the war. These include back pay for
Hacienda employees (100,000 pounds) and the military (33,000 pounds), tre-
asury bills emitted to cover missed coupons on domestic bonds (15,000
pounds), forced loans (32,000 pounds), debt to Ecuador for assistance pro-
vided (20,000 pounds), debt to tobacco planters (30,000 pounds), and for
contracts with private firms and individuals (in excess of 100,000 pounds).
Ironically, one of the private creditors is the British firm of Powles,
Illingworth and Co., the agents for the British bondholders, who in 1841 lo-
aned the government 25,000 pounds at an interest rate of six per cent. About
one half of the war debt had been paid back by January 1845, leaving about
240,000 pounds of special debt still to pay, over and above the domestic debt
pre-dating the war. These debts, most of which were from the Gran
Colombian domestic debt, plus the unpaid interest on them, amounted to
about two million pounds sterling. They carried interest of between zero and
six per cent.
Prior to the beginning of the war, New Granada had representatives in
London in discussions with foreign bondholders, at the same time as repre-
sentatives of Venezuela (Committee of Spanish American Bondholders,
1840). The proposed settlement was scuttled because of the war. In his 1844
report to Congress, the Treasury Minister wrote,
«Despite the sincere desires of the government to conclude a satis-
factory agreement with foreign creditors and on the part of New
Granada, nothing has been done about the matter and things remain
in the same state as they were at the end of the last Congressional ses-
sion... Although the President is fully authorized to arrange for pay-
ment taking necessary funds from the national revenue, it is also true
that a substantial debt weighs on those revenues, a debt that was con-
tracted for the maintenance of constitutional government during the
last war, and for the satisfaction of that debt the richest branches of the
treasury are especially mortgaged. If it were to deduct from these funds
a considerable sum for paying the foreign debt, the credit of the nation
would not advance, what would be gained abroad would be lost at
home, and if unfortunately the revolutionary occurrences that have
caused such enormous damage to the Republic should repeat them-
selves, the Government would not be able to find anyone to lend it
money».
In sum, New Granada presents an example of a country heavily burdened
by debt, accruing extraordinary expenses during war, funding them by emer-
gency measures, and giving preference to emergency creditors over external
bondholders for clearly articulated political reasons. Other examples abound.
In the course of eleven years (1840-1851) Rosas paid off the Buenos Aires
domestic debt of over fifty-four million pesos, leaving the external debt in
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23 Platt (1983, p. 30).
24 See Quiroz (1987).
25 Berglund (1995, p. 445), Eastwick (1868). This was forthcoming in 1862, issued by Barings,
only after arrangements were made for the bondholders of the original bondholders, whose 1859
settlement had fallen immediately into arrears. Venezuela maintained payments for just enough
time to take out a further foreign loan in 1864. Both loans caused quite a scandal in London fi-
nancial circles, and Venezuela defaulted on each in sequence over the next three years. Edward
Eastwick, who negotiated the 1864 loan on behalf of the bank, General Credit, blamed the English
government, which, he said, «gratuitously parades its determination not to enforce the claims of
its subjects. Now, whatever the intentions of a claimant may be, it is surely very unwise to pro-
claim beforehand that resort will not be had to ulterior measures. It is like putting up a board to
warn trespassers that they will not be prosecuted» (Eastwick, p. 328). The case of Venezuela’s ac-
cess to foreign credit despite its poor record of debt service is the exception among the countries
in our study.
default untouched 23. The Peruvian merchant elite only endorsed the Peruvian
debt settlement after the consolidation of the domestic debt was well under
way in 1849. A number of foreign loans received by the Peruvian government
in 1853 were famously earmarked for the conversion of a massive portion of
the domestic debt into external debt 24.
For some countries, at times the debt burden was so great that the service
of many domestic debts was suspended. The frequent revolutions in
Venezuela from 1846 to 1856 led to a series of emergency loans (see their ef-
fect on the budget in Panel H of Figure 5). The peaks in military spending and
widening government budget deficits correspond clearly with wars. Note that
because Venezuelan fiscal years were from July 1 to June 30, there is a lag in
the effect of some of the wars. The very large increases in total expenditures
in the early 1850s reflect attempts to consolidate the debt, and, according to
Berglund (1995), military-related expenses as well. The Treasury Minister of
Venezuela pleaded with Congress in early 1857, just after another revolution,
to rein in spending, so that they could properly serve their debts. If they did
not, he said, the government would be forced to serve its domestic creditors
selectively, which would cause widespread discontent and fuel another re-
volution. In 1847 the domestic debt was about 325,000 pounds sterling, and
consisted mostly of long-term bonds inherited from Gran Colombia. By 1858,
the domestic debt had reached a size nearly equal to the foreign bonds: about
3.5 million pounds sterling (22.2 million pesos), while the external debt was
at that time nearly 4 million pounds including interest arrears since 1848.
The most serious civil war since independence then broke out, but the
Treasury was already in what the minister described as «chaotic conditions».
Local loans were being offered only at an interest rate of 1.5 per cent monthly,
for full payment in 20 months, and with a mortgage of 50 per cent of cus-
toms. Only at this juncture did the government go to London to try to arrange
for a settlement and a new foreign loan 25.
In sum, the evidence from the Treasury clearly shows that wars led to de-
velopments in the fiscal sphere that negatively impacted the capacity of coun-
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26 For a recent assessment of the relative importance of wars on credit risk see Flandreau and
Zumer (2004). The authors find that wars had a negative impact on credit worthiness during the first
wave of globalization 1880-1913.
27 Bond price data are from Course of the Exchange and the Economist.
28 Fowler (2000), who offers a revisionist interpretation of Mexico’s internal conflict during this
period, believes that most are overblown, and that they had relatively little impact. He makes two
exceptions: the 1832 revolt and the 1854-55 Ayutla Revolt, which he says were the only ones that
truly had national implications and involved large segments of the population.
tries to service their foreign debt. Faced with increased military expenditu-
res, and the need to satisfy domestic emergency creditors, we provided exam-
ples of countries in default that delayed settlement, and others that were ser-
vicing their debts and chose to default. In what follows we examine how
investors in Spanish American sovereign debt incorporated news about war
into their behavior in the London bond market.
6. WARS AND THE BOND MARKET
From letters to The Times of London, investor reports in Fenn’s
Compendia, as well as publications of the Committee of Spanish American
Bondholders, and later Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, it is clear that
the investing public was tuned into political and military developments
abroad. Investors would factor in their views on the likelihood of repayment
when determining their willingness to pay for the bonds in question, and
thus their cumulative views should be observable in bond prices 26.
Figure 6 presents the prices of each country’s bonds during the years 1830-
1869, and shades in the years in which there were wars 27. In order to take
into account the fluctuations of the market, as well as examine a measure of
the risk premium of these securities, we calculate the spread between the
yield of the Spanish American bonds and the yield of the British Consol.
These are presented in Figure 7. Note that these are informal definitions of
«yield», since there were no dividends paid for countries in default.
The diagrams provide strong evidence that across Spanish America, wars
are generally associated with lower bond prices (higher yield spreads). Not
all wars had equal impacts, and some countries appeared to have had wars
with more significant bond market effects than other countries did.
Especially large effects are notable in the case of Mexico, whether it be du-
ring the internal conflicts of 1832 and the 1850s or during the wars over Texas
and the U.S.-Mexican war of the late 1840s 28. Mexico is also noteworthy be-
cause of two apparent anomalies —the steep rise in bond prices in the late
1840s and in the 1860s—. The former is associated with the U.S. indemnity
payment, of which a portion was earmarked for bondholders, a key ingre-
dient in the partially successful settlement of 1850 (Tenenbaum, 1986;
Bazant, 1968). The latter is associated with the French invasion that installed
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29 The French invasion was preceded by a series of events in 1860-1861 that were intimately in-
volved with the foreign debt. A dispute over claims culminated in a mid-1861 announcement that
Mexico would begin a two-year moratorium on all foreign debt payments. This was ostensibly the
rationale for the French invasion. Platt has argued that Britain did not pursue a policy of military
intervention for bondholders during this period, which is backed up by a memorandum by the
British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, and much correspondence published in a special vo-
lume of the Sessional Papers (Great Britain, 1847), and the perceptions of bank agents (e.g.,
Eastwick, 1868).
Maximilian as emperor 29. The initial reaction in London to the French in-
vasion and the commitment by the emperor to service the Mexican debt was
very positive. As the Mexicans began to gain the upper hand, the yield spread
rose back to levels not seen since the U.S.-Mexican War.
In other countries, major effects are also clear: Venezuela in 1847, 1853
and during the Federal War; New Granada during its sequence of civil wars;
Chile and Peru during their war in the 1830s; Ecuador during its wars of the
late 1850s and early 1860s; and Buenos Aires in the 1830s and 1850s. The
case of Ecuador is interesting in that its new bonds issued according to the
Sources: Course of the Exchange and the Economist.
Note: We used the Gleditsch-Correlates of War criteria for Buenos Aires/Argentina and Mexico, and
we used our alternative criteria for the other countries.
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settlement of 1855 paid one per cent interest, which resulted in very low pri-
ces but also low yield spreads during the 1850s and 1860s. Thus, despite the
substantial conflict the country endured and the fact that it was behind on
payments, the yield spread on its bonds versus the consol remained below ten
percentage points until complete default at the end of our data series.
One can also observe that the countries that carried out successful debt
settlements —Argentina, Chile and Peru— maintained relatively small yield
spreads, especially in the 1860s during the conflicts for which they negotia-
ted further foreign loans. The wars among the countries that had settled suc-
cessfully increased the yield spread, but did not appear to shake investors’
confidence nearly as much as wars elsewhere. This suggests that the bond
market might be more sensitive to military and political conflict in coun-
tries that are in default than for countries servicing their debt. This could
possibly be due as much to the different types of investors who choose to
trade in defaulted debt versus debt that pays regular dividends, as to the eco-
nomic and/or political fundamentals in those countries. In the case of Peru,
Vizcarra (2009) has shown that after settlement, warfare was of secondary
Sources: Course of the Exchange and the Economist.
Note: We used the Gleditsch-Correlates of War criteria for Buenos Aires/Argentina and Mexico, and
we used the alternative criteria for the other countries.
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30 The number of breaks for each country is as follows: Buenos Aires, 10; Chile, 6; Ecuador, 3;
Mexico, 11; New Granada, 5; Peru, 6; Venezuela, 10. Full results, covering the 51 breaks for the
seven countries, are available upon request. Because of discontinuities in the time series for Ecuador
and New Granada, we restricted our estimation in those cases to the longest period of continuous
yield spreads (1856-1869 for Ecuador and 1846-1861 for New Granada).
importance because of the strong credible commitment that guano gave to
Peruvian paper.
In order to reach more precise conclusions about the effects of war, we es-
timate structural breaks in the series of yield spreads using the methodology
of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). Their procedure involves the use of a dyna-
mic programming algorithm to identify breakpoints in times series that mi-
nimize the sum of squared errors. The procedure estimates both the number
of breaks and a constant yield spread between the breaks. The number of bre-
aks is selected using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The proce-
dure requires the researcher to set a minimum interval of parameter stability.
We conducted the estimations using intervals of two and three years (24 and
36 monthly observations). We present estimates below using the two-year in-
tervals. The results are robust to estimations using the three-year intervals.
Over a period known for political and economic instability, it is not sur-
prising that there were a number of structural breaks in these time series. The
procedure detected a total of fifty-one breaks, thirty-seven of which occurred
during or after the end of a war (twenty-eight during war and nine after the
end of a war) 30. These results confirm that foreign investors watched the mi-
litary and political upheaval that those countries endured during the early re-
publican period closely, and viewed these events as having serious conse-
quences for the likelihood of debt service and default.
In Table 6 we present the two breaks in each series that are associated with
the highest percentage change in the yield spread. The table lists the break
date and a 95 per cent confidence interval around it. The percentage change
in the yield spread refers to the change from the interval prior to the break to
that after the break. For example, in the case of Buenos Aires, the largest per-
centage change in the yield spread was + 77.9 per cent (from 16.3 to 29.0 per
cent). The procedure estimated a yield spread of 16.3 per cent for a period of
39 months prior to May 1837, and a yield spread of 29.0 per cent for the 44
months after that date. In the interest of space, we present only the data on
break dates, confidence intervals and the percentage change in yield spreads.
The breaks that we detect match closely with those visible in the graphs.
Many of these breaks coincide with major wars: Buenos Aires in 1847, Chile
in 1837, Ecuador in 1861 and 1863, Mexico in 1836 and 1846, New Granada
in 1854, and Venezuela in 1848 and 1853. Others coincide with debt settle-
ment, such as Chile in 1841 and Peru in 1849. The percentage change in the
estimated yield spreads is extremely high in each case (at least 40 per cent),
highlighting both the instability of yields and the dramatic impact of these
events. It is also worth noticing that international conflicts stand out as ha-
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TABLE 6
STRUCTURAL BREAKS IN YIELD SPREADS OF SPANISH AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT BONDS AGAINST THE BRITISH CONSOL
95% Percentaje
Country Break Date Confidence Change in Event
Interval Yield Spread
Buenos Aires May 1837 April 1837- +77.9 per cent Monetary reform     
June 1837 and large issue of
domestic bonds
June 1847 Dec. 1846- +68.5 per cent Blockade
July 1847
Chile May 1837 April 1837- +79.6 per cent War with Peru-
June 1837 Bolivia
June 1841 May 1841- –57.1 per cent Anticipation of debt
Sept. 1841 settlement
Ecuador July 1861 June 1861- –41.3 per cent End of Civil War
Sept. 1861
Nov. 1863 Sept. 1863- +88.9 per cent War with Colombia
Dec. 1863
Mexico August 1836 July 1836- +68.9 per cent Texas obtains
Sept. 1836 independence
Oct. 1846 August 1846- +92.5 per cent War with United
Nov. 1846 States
New Granada March 1848 Feb. 1848- +188.2 per cent Anticipation of
April 1848 default
Feb. 1854 Jan. 1854- +66.7 per cent Civil War
March 1854
Peru April 1833 March 1833- –47.3 per cent Re-establishment of
August 1833 diplomatic relations
with Great Britain
February 1849 Jan. 1849- –81.2 per cent Debt settlement
March 1849
Venezuela March 1848 Feb. 1848- +361.1 per cent Default & Civil War
April 1848
December 1853 Nov. 1853- +107.1 per cent Civil War
Jan. 1854
Notes:
* All coefficient estimates are significant at the one per cent level.
** The samples are monthly from Jan. 1830 until Dec. 1869 for Buenos Aires, Chile, Mexico, and
Peru. For Ecuador the sample is monthly from Feb. 1856 until Dec. 1869; for New Granada from Feb. 1846
until Dec. 1861; for Venezuela from April 1841 until Jan. 1869.
*** For each, we report the two breaks that resulted in the largest percentage change in the yield
spread. See text for explanation of the estimation procedure (Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003). Statistics on the
other breaks are available upon request.
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ving the most dramatic effects for most countries. By and large, the evidence
from the London capital market shows that military conflicts had a signifi-
cant effect on investors’ perception of sovereign risk.
CONCLUSIONS
We examined the historical relationship between war and external debt
service for seven Spanish American countries before 1870. Data from their
Treasury ministries show that, as expected, government revenue often fell,
and military spending spiked, during wars. Governments that were in de-
fault on foreign debt relied on extensive access to emergency credit that took
a striking number of forms, and was often supplied by important domestic
players with political and economic clout. Servicing the domestic debt took
priority over the external debt as a result.
Taken as a whole, the Treasury data illustrate the intense strains that mi-
litary conflict placed on these countries, and the calculations that many of the
governments made to forgo service on the external debt as a consequence. Yet
the countries that had established a record of debt service, and thus were
able to borrow abroad, chose to maintain external debt service and often is-
sued new foreign debt during wars. Further, we provide econometric evi-
dence on the yield spreads of sovereign bonds on the London Stock Exchange
to show that foreign investors viewed many of the wars in Spanish America
as increasing the likelihood of default (or decreasing the likelihood of settle-
ment). Prices fell —and yield spreads rose— during the most serious of these
conflicts, often by very large percentages. Indeed, the largest structural bre-
aks we estimate in the series of yield spreads were —in nearly every ins-
tance— associated with a war. Our results suggest that not only were wars
important, but that they may have been the single most critical factor affec-
ting investors’ perceptions of sovereign risk.
Future work might address the observed asymmetry between the «settle-
ment club» of Argentina, Chile and Peru on the one hand, and Ecuador, Mexico,
New Granada, and Venezuela, on the other. The fiscal data show that Argentina,
Chile and Peru, experienced large increases in government revenues —much
larger than in other countries— prior to settlement. Peru experienced a guano
boom that was central to its debt settlement and lengthy period of debt service.
For Chile and Argentina, a large increase in customs revenues was the key to
increase government income. What role did integration with the world eco-
nomy play? Did all of the default countries have lackluster trade performances?
Not only might the failure to settle debt be the result of a slow rate of com-
mercial expansion, but it might also be the case that, as Bergquist (1978) hypo-
thesizes for Colombia, commercial cycles are related to cycles of conflict.
Additional research can build upon our results to investigate to what degree
trade, war and debt service might be endogenous to one another.
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There is also the vexing question of whether some of these wars had an
impact on subsequent political development that in the long run was bene-
ficial for the government’s solvency, thereby overriding any shorter run ne-
gative ramifications. Indeed, much research in the area will undoubtedly
focus on the interaction between changing domestic political institutions fis-
cal conditions and debt service. The discussion of these critical relationships
would help illuminate the complex links between foreign capital, political
order and economic growth in the region.
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TABLE A
WARS IN SPANISH AMERICA, 1825-1870
Country Years of Conflict Opponent(s)
Buenos Aires 1825-1828 Brazil
1828-1831 Civil
1833-1835 Civil
1837-1838 Bolivia-Peru
1838-1852 Uruguay-European Allies-
Civil
1838-1839; 1845-1847 France-United Kingdom
1859 Civil
1861 Civil
1863 Civil
1865-1870 Paraguay
1870-1871 Civil
Chile 1825-1826 Spain (Independence)
1829-1830 Civil
1836-1839 Peru-Bolivia
1851 Civil
1859 Civil
1865-1866 Spain
Ecuador 1825-1826 Spain in Peru
1828-1829 Peru
1830-1832 Gran Colombia
1833-1834 Civil (Chihuahuas)
1840-1841 Border Conflict
1845 Civil
1851-1852 Civil
1858-1860 Peru-Civil
1860 Granadine Confederation
1863 United States of Colombia
1864-1865 Civil
Mexico 1827 Civil
1829 Spain
1832 Civil
1835-1836 Civil (Texas)
1836-1843 Civil and Texas
1838 France
1844-1845 Civil (Paredes-Santa Anna)
1846-1848 United States
1847-1855 Civil (Caste)
APPENDIX
continous
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Sources: Gleditsch (2004), Scheina (2003), Bethell (1987).
Note: Italicized years and wars refer to differences between the two definitions of wars described in
the text. Years in bold are an incomplete list of blockade years.
Country Years of Conflict Opponent(s)
1854-1856 Civil (Ayutla Revolt and
Prelude to Reforma)
1857-1860 Civil (Reforma)
1862-1867 France
New Granada/Granadine
Confederation/United
States of Colombia 1825-1826 Spain in Peru
1828-1829 Peru
1830-1832 Gran Colombia
1839-1842 Civil
1851 Civil
1854 Civil
1860-1862 Civil
1863 Ecuador
Peru 1825-1826 Spain (Independence)
1828-1829 Gran Colombia
1834-1835 Civil
1836-1839 Chile
1841-1842 Bolivia
1842-1844 Civil
1853-1855 Civil
1856-1858 Civil
1858-1860 Ecuador
1864-1866 Spain
1867-1868 Civil
Venezuela 1825-1826 Spain in Peru
1828-1829 Peru
1831 Civil
1835-1837 Civil
1846 Civil
1848-1849 Civil
1859-1863 Civil (Federal)
1868-1871 Civil
continuation
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